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Improved Management, Policy Changes

Secretary Laird Reveals New Image, Objectives

New approaches in management of the Department of Defense, and accomplishments and objectives during the first year of the Nixon Administration highlighted two speeches by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

In a Jan. 15 speech before the California State Chamber of Commerce, in Los Angeles, Secretary Laird said, "In Washington, new leadership has taken command."

The Secretary noted that a little less than one year ago, in the historic setting on the steps of the East Front of the Capitol, Richard Nixon spoke his first words as President to the people of the nation.

"Each moment in history," President Nixon said, "is a fleeting time, precious and unique. But some stand out as moments of beginning, in which courses are set that shape decades or centuries.

"This can be such a moment.

"Forces now are converging that make possible, for the first time, the hope that many of man's deepest aspirations can at last be realized."

Secretary Laird said, "Today, one year later, it is too soon to say that 1969 marked the beginning of a new era in which many will realize his deepest aspirations. Yet it can be said that 1969 has been a year of change and that a beginning has been made toward better things for the people of our nation."

In Santa Monica, Jan. 16, Secretary Laird spoke at the Jaycees' 32nd Congress of America's Ten Outstanding Young Men, and said, "I am proud of the productive efforts which the Defense Department has made to combat discrimination,

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CENTO SEMINAR—U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. G. F. Blood, USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, (fourth from left) discusses a point of interest with chairmen of the national delegations during a recent Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) seminar in Wiesbaden, Germany. Left to right are Lt. Col. V. A. Mavor, British Royal Army; Lt. Col. Ali Azadegan, Imperial Iranian Air Force; Brig. Gen. M. R. Ulugbay, Turkish Army; Gp. Capt. Muhammed Naseer Butt, Pakistan Air Force; and Col. Robert Litle, U.S. Army. General Blood served as chairman of the week-long airlift/air mobility seminar. (U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTO)

Troops Informed

Authorities Endorse Free Flow of News

The policy of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is that the American people —including U.S. servicemen and women —be fully informed about matters of national defense and that the Defense Department conduct its activities in an open manner consistent with the need for security.

Soon after taking office Secretary Laird announced that unclassified information, other than that exempted by the Freedom of Information Act, must be readily accessible to the public and the press.

At a Los Angeles news conference Jan. 15, 1970, Secretary Laird was asked about "selective censorship" by American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) stations.

"The policy has been," he said, "to continue giving the American troops the

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Secretary Laird Reveals New Image, Objectives

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to help the disadvantaged, and to relieve distress. I am proud of what we have done to provide equal opportunity within the armed forces, of our progress in ending discrimination in off-base housing for military personnel, of the help we have given to hundreds of thousands of disadvantaged youngsters in summer employment and in recreational activities.

"One of our major efforts to help those who suffer hardship was begun shortly after I became Secretary of Defense—the effort to improve the lot of the Americans who are prisoners of war in Southeast Asia and to bring some comfort to their families here at home. For the families of the 1400 servicemen listed as missing in action, each day of uncertainty about the fate of a loved one is an ordeal which they have met with great courage."

Following are additional remarks of Secretary Laird to the Chamber of Commerce:

In Washington, new leadership has taken command. New policies, geared to the problems of the 1970's, have been introduced. New directions have been set. But before discussing these new directions and policies, let me introduce a note of caution. Although we have made progress, and it has been notable progress on many fronts, we are not about to run out of problems. Old problems still abound, and new ones are inevitably created as by-products of change and innovation.

With that note of caution, let me cite a few examples of the new spirit and the new purpose that saw the light of day in 1969 under the new Administration.

—The President has proposed a sharing of Federal revenues with states and localities in order to halt excessive centralization and to reinvigorate state and local government.

—The President has proposed a thorough overhaul of the welfare system, substituting for it a Family Assistance Plan to transform welfare recipients into productive self-sustaining citizens.

—The President has proposed effective action to stem the tide of crime and has waged unremitting attacks on the types of criminal activity that are subject to Federal jurisdiction, especially organized crime.

—The President has made manpower training programs more comprehensive and more effective, resulting in an increase of one-third in the number of enrollees in such programs.

—The President has used his powers vigorously to overcome hunger and discrimination.

—The President has proposed dramatic improvements in transportation, notably in mass transit, in airway facilities and equipment, and in merchant shipping.

These examples are drawn from domestic policy fields. In foreign and defense policy as well, the Nixon Administration has moved in a new direction.

Desire for Peace

And the new direction in foreign and defense policy leads more surely toward realization of man's most profound aspiration—the desire for peace.

In 1969, our Nation turned a corner and started on a new course away from the war in which we have been heavily engaged for almost five years and away from the danger of involvement in similar conflicts in the future.

We have embarked on a new policy to achieve the objective which our Nation has been pursuing in Vietnam. There are some, it is true, who say it is not new. Yet, in prior years, the number of American troops in Vietnam went up and up and up. Now it is going down. Clearly there is an important difference between increasing American forces in Vietnam—and reducing them. There is an important difference between a policy that places the major combat responsibility on our GI's—and one that places that responsibility on the Vietnamese.

Because the Nixon Administration has energetically concentrated on improving the training and equipment of the forces of Vietnam and on assisting the South Vietnamese to develop a more stable society, we have been able to announce since last June reduction of the American troop authorization ceiling for Vietnam by 115,000 men. We have been able to turn over to the South Vietnamese an ever greater share of the responsibility for defense of their country.

Let me repeat the word of caution that I voiced at the outset. The progress in Vietnam has been substantial, but it would be a mistake to expect no setbacks. There are battles ahead, and it would be surprising if all of them were won by the Republic of Vietnam. I don't make forecasts of future events. We should guard against overconfidence now when things are going well, and we should guard equally against exaggerated pessimism if the future brings some setbacks.

Most Important Policy Change

Of all the policy changes of the first year of the present Administration, none is more important than Vietnamization, for this new policy for Vietnam is in fact an application and a test of a broader policy toward Asia, which the President announced at Guam and which has been called the Nixon Doctrine. In the future, the President declared, we shall seek to help Asian nations that merit our support more by enabling them to do things themselves rather than by doing things for them. He summarized the doctrine in three principles:

"First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

"Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

"Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."

The Nixon Doctrine is a new policy, laying the basis for a realistic form of collective security in a part of the world in which Western European nations are no longer willing to shoulder a major responsibility for peace and security. The doctrine is in harmony with the desires of Asian nations a

they grow in vigor and in pride. It affirms the continuing interest of the United States in Asia, but makes it clear that we will not write any blank checks. It is a middle course between the extremes of isolationism and serving as global policeman. We reject both of these extremes.

New Objectives

We have made a beginning toward many other new objectives in the field of defense during this past year.

We are moving toward smaller and more efficient military forces. Assisted both by the diminution of our role in Vietnam and by management reforms, we can provide the security which the nation requires with a trimmer Defense establishment. By next June, we shall have reduced military personnel by about 300,000 and civilian employees by 72,000. These are significant cuts, and they are being made in the relatively short time span of one year.

Fewer personnel and better management plus a stiff backbone produce budget reductions. And we have reduced the defense budget, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the Gross National Product.

I am not sure that the magnitude of the cuts that are being made is fully understood. The cuts made in the defense budget for the present fiscal year submitted by President Johnson amount to more than $4 billion in expenditures and more than $8 billion in appropriations. From the fourth quarter of 1968 to the third quarter of 1969, the spending of the Defense Department was reduced by $3.7 billion at an annual rate and by a full percentage point in relation to the Gross National Product.

The Department of Defense in this fiscal year is spending less than 40 cents of every dollar disbursed by the Federal Treasury. This is a cut of 9 per cent from Defense's share of Federal spending in the last full fiscal year of the preceding Administration. When the President submits the budget for the coming fiscal year to Congress, it will reveal that defense spending will be approximately $10 billion below the 1971 estimate of the preceding Administration. It will be the lowest defense budget as a percentage of the Gross National Product in 20 years.

Budget Decisions

The decisions reflected in these reductions were not arrived at lightly. They follow the most comprehensive and intensive study of national needs and national resources that any Administration has ever undertaken.

Everyone who has been exposed to an introductory course in economics knows that the basic economic problem is the allotment of limited resources to the satisfaction of unlimited wants. Those involved in Federal budget decisions for Fiscal Year 1971 have been grappling with this problem. The maximum resources which the National Government can command cannot be stretched to satisfy all the legitimate and meritorious claims made on them.

In his budget decisions, along with the objective of providing for national security against external threats, the President has weighed other objectives, particularly accelerated progress in meeting a number of pressing domestic problems and in curbing inflation.

In his judgment, and in mine, the reduced level of military spending will provide adequate and prudent defense. Any such judgment must be made subject to revision in view of the volatile character of many areas of the world and uncertainties about the future course of events.

Changes in Draft

Let me turn to another important change of 1969 which will affect many Americans in the years ahead. This year we shall be drafting fewer men and using a more equitable system of selective service. No longer are young men compelled to undergo the uncertainty of the draft for as long as seven years of their lives. The period of uncertainty now has been cut to only one year, and the disruption of individuals' lives has been substantially curtailed. By using a random method of choosing the individuals who will be called to service in place of a more arbitrary method of calling oldest men first, we have introduced a new element of fairness into the system. The reform of the Selective Service System, which few thought possible of achievement, is a major accomplishment. I think it has demonstrated, among other things, the willingness of the Administration to listen to the legitimate grievances of young people and to act to remove such grievances when convinced by rational discourse that corrective action is needed. Additional reforms will be proposed to Congress in the near future. The Defense Department is ready to testify in support of those changes to the Selective Service process.

The ultimate objective of the Nixon Administration is the establishment of an all-volunteer armed force and the elimination of the draft, except as a stand-by device. Although the nation is not yet at the point at which it can make this change in recruiting military personnel, again an important beginning was made in 1969. A Presidential Commission, chaired by former Defense Secretary Thomas Gates, spent the year in intensive study of how this transition can be accomplished. Hopefully, a number of reforms designed to increase the attractiveness of a miiltary career can be offered in the near future.

DoD Management Reforms

It is particularly appropriate before this audience to mention management of the Defense Department. Something new has been happening in this area during the past year. For much of what has been achieved, the Nation is indebted to one who formerly had a place on the Board of your organization—my able Deputy, Dave Packard. Dave is a tower of strength in dealing with the whole range of problems that are encountered in connection with defense policy, but I have relied especially on his abundant talents in dealing with problems of management.

There have been accomplishments in the field of management, although substantial problems remain. In the acquisition and management of weapon systems, we have introduced new techniques to provide greater efficiency and particularly to reduce cost overruns, but the system we inherited is cumbersome, complicated, and not susceptible to instant change. We have established a Blue Ribbon Panel that is now studying the organization and operation of the Defense Department. From it I expect recommendations that will move us even further toward a management system that will reduce to an absolute

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USE OF U.S. POWER ABROAD

Our National Commitments

A key issue in U.S. foreign policy today is the extent and nature of our national commitments.

Precisely what is a national commitment? Noting that in recent years definition of this term has become obscured, a Senate Resolution of June 25, 1969, described a national commitment as "the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United States . . ."

Following are excerpts from a new State Department pamphlet, "Issues in Foreign Policy—No. 3, Commitments of U.S. Power Abroad."

Whether commitments of power abroad are the result of treaties, resolutions, executive agreements, public or private statements of support, or from spontaneous generation of policy in a crisis, virtually all such commitments are made in the belief that they are required by the national interest.

As circumstances change, the requirements of national interest might change. Rarely is the precise nature of a commitment spelled out, even in the most explicit treaties, because as governments and societies change, the capacity or need to commit national power changes.

Obviously, a formal treaty, approved by the Senate, is the strongest expression of national commitment. At the same time, where national interest is involved, the absence of a treaty or other formal declaration does not preclude involvement of U.S. power.

Shifts in Policy

For example, at the beginning of World War II the supposed strength of the French and British forces led the U.S. Government to maintain a policy of neutrality. However, after the shocking success of the Nazi armies and the collapse of France a new view of the national interest prevailed. Despite the official position of "armed neutrality," commitments were made to assist Britain militarily in every possible way short of war.

Such a shift in policy was dictated, not by formal military treaties with Britain, but by U.S. recognition that neutrality in the face of Hitler's impending conquest of Europe could no longer serve the national interest.

On the other hand, the Truman doctrine would seem to commit the United States to the defense of any "free peoples" attacked from the outside. Under that doctrine, the U.S. has, indeed, assisted in the defense of several countries threatened with attack by Communist powers. Nevertheless, when Communist China invaded Tibet in 1950, very little could be done for landlocked Tibet short of involving the United States in a full-scale war with China, and perhaps with the Soviet Union. Thus, the U.S. did not feel it could protect Tibet, and did not find it in the national interest to attempt it.

These examples demonstrate that a government in determining what actions would be in the national interest must start by answering two questions:

What can be done? What are the capabilities and resources of the government in the existing circumstances?

What must be done? What are the absolute requirements in terms of our safety, that of our friends, allies, and of the human race? What are the available alternatives—the real options in the real world, as distinguished from theoretical options that might be considered in hypothetical treatments of the problem?

Debate in the U.S.

In the United States, debate on the issue of national commitments abroad focuses on three points:

• What is truly in the national interest? Some would argue for drastic reductions of U.S. involvement throughout the world. Others believe we should maintain our commitments in the industrial areas of Europe and Japan, but terminate our military commitments in the underdeveloped regions. Still others argue that, with a growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, national interest requires a continued U.S. presence in these regions. Some argue that commitments abroad create instability at home by reducing our capability to solve our own domestic problems—problems which in turn create more dangers to the national interest.

• What is truly the capability of the United States? Can we continue to be a global power with global commitments? Some flatly argue "no." Others say such commitments are possible only if coupled with larger commitments from the countries in each region. Still others say the risks of withdrawal, over the long run, are so dangerous to U.S. national interest that virtually any sacrifice is justified to maintain the U.S. position of world leadership until all countries accept and contribute to effective maintenance of the peace by an international organization.

• Who decides what is and is not in the national interest? The Constitution provides that the Congress shall declare war. On the other hand, it is argued, the President's power as commander in chief to commit U.S. troops to armed conflict has been exercised time and again throughout the history of the country. Some argue that added restraints are needed, such as congressional debate and approval before the commitment of U.S. military power. Others say, to bind the President to slower procedures would be extremely dangerous. Either way there is risk.

No Perfect Solution

The issue is a critical one for the people of the United States. In approaching the subject, [one] must expect to discover complex and valid arguments on both sides. He must also recognize that no completely satisfactory solution will be reached. It is that kind of problem. It is that kind of world.

U.S. Involvement Since World War II

Direct Involvement in International Crises

Berlin—Direct involvement in a series of crises in Berlin, 1945-present, as one of four occupying powers under the 1945 quadripartite agreements.

Korea—Direct military intervention in Korea, 1950-53, under the aegis of the United Nations.

Vietnam—Introduction of combat troops in agreement with the Republic of Vietnam, 1965; bombing of military targets in North Vietnam, 1964, 1965-68—justified through SEATO and the Tonkin Gulf resolution (1964).

China—Direct involvement under Presidents Truman (1950) and Eisenhower (1953) in the Communist Chinese threat to the Formosa Strait through the positioning of the 7th Fleet.

Lebanon—Direct military intervention at the threat of a Communist coup in Lebanon, 1958.

Cuba—Involvement as the provider of logistical support for the Cuban invasion force in the Bay of Pigs episode, 1961.

Cuba—Direct involvement in declaring and enforcing the quarantine of missile shipments to Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis, 1962-63.

Dominican Republic—Direct military intervention during the Dominican crisis, 1965; contributor to the OAS peace force to stabilize the country and permit free elections.

Thailand—Dispatch of U.S. Army forces to Thailand, endangered by the Laotian crisis in 1962, in response to a request from the Thai Government and in line with U.S. obligations under SEATO.

Partial U.S. Involvement

Greek Civil War—1945-49, partial involvement through military and economic assistance.

Iran—1945-46, supported Iran's demand that Soviets evacuate Azerbaijan.

Malaysian-Indonesian Conflict—Partial involvement in arranging cease-fire and supplying good-offices mission, 1963-66.

Arab-Israeli Dispute—Partial involvement in efforts to promote a peaceful settlement, 1948-present.

Greek-Turkish-Cypriot Dispute—Partial involvement as principal financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping force and through bilateral negotiations with each of the parties to promote a peaceful settlement, 1957-present.

Laos—Partial involvement in Laotian struggle with Viet Minh-supported Pathet Lao, 1959-present; involvement as co-signer of the 1962 Geneva accords.

Congo—1964 and 1967, small task forces were dispatched by air to provide security for evacuees.

Sino-Indian Border War—Partial involvement as supplier of increased military aid to India, 1962-63.

No Direct Involvement

Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia—1948.

Soviet Invasion of Hungary—1956.

India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir—1948—present.

Algerian Independence Movement—1954-62.

Congo Crisis Over Secession of Katanga Province—1960-64.

War in Yemen—1962-65.

India-Pakistan Conflict in Rann of Cutch—1965.

Biafra's Secession from Nigeria—1967.

Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia—1968.

Chinese Communist—USSR Border Conflict—1969.

Honduras-El Salvador Dispute—1969.

U.S. Involvement Through Treaty Commitments, Joint Resolutions, and Major Statements of Policy

Signing of U.N. Charter—1945.

Rio Pact—1947.

Enunciation of Truman Doctrine—1947.

Signing of Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS)—1948.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—1949.

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines—1951.

ANZUS (Australia New Zealand U.S.) *Pact*—1951.

Mutual Security Treaty with Japan—1951. Renewed—1960.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of Korea—1953.

SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)—1954.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China—1954.

Formosa Straits Resolution—1955.

Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East—1957 (Eisenhower Doctrine).

Declaration Committing U.S. to Cooperate With Nations of the Baghdad Pact—1958.

Bilateral Defense Agreements with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—1959.

Twenty Countries, Other Than Treaty Partners, Received U.S. Military Assistance in FY 1969.

Secretary Laird Reveals New Image, Objectives

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minimum the waste and inefficiency that have characterized some practices of the past.

In the field of management, an important change has been made in the selectivity with which operations have been decentralized in some cases and centralized in others. Dave Packard and I both felt that the offices which we moved into a year ago were overly involved in making decisions that could be better made at lower echelons and in exercising detailed surveillance over operations at lower levels. We have sought to correct excessive and unwieldy centralization by shifting authority to the military services whenever greater efficiency was likely to result from such a transfer. Conversely we have centralized the function of resource management in the intelligence field, for example. I think the effect of such changes has been to increase efficiency at all levels. I cannot say that I have reduced my workload by this process, but I am able to devote more time and thought to the most important problems by permitting others to handle problems of secondary importance.

We have not hesitated to centralize authority when better policy formulation or efficiency dictate this course. But we want to realize the advantage of decentralization of management processes wherever possible.

I have been deeply concerned about the welfare of those American servicemen who are prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. For the families of the 1400 servicemen listed as missing in action, each day of uncertaintly about the fate of a loved one is an ordeal which they face with inspiring courage.

During the past year we have made special effort to lay the facts about these men before the tribunal of world opinion. We have tried in a number of ways to persuade Hanoi to observe the rules of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war by making available the names of prisoners, by establishing a regular flow of mail between them and their relatives, by permitting Red Cross inspection of prison facilities, and by releasing the sick and injured. We shall continue to make every effort to bring about observance of the Geneva Convention and to ease the ordeal of the wives and parents of missing servicemen.

I could go on indefinitely with a catalogue of changes in objectives and methods that have been instituted in the Defense Department in the past year. For example, I would like very much to discuss the President's new policy toward the instruments of chemical warfare and biological research which is designed to reduce the possibility that such weapons may be used in the future. But to talk further would be an abuse of your generous hospitality.

I began with a quotation from the President's inaugural address in which he expressed the hope that this might be a moment of beginning a new course.

Later in that address, he expressed more specifically the greatest hope that guides him as he discharges his fearsome responsibilities. The President said:

"The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker. This honor now beckons America—the chance to help lead the world at last out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of since the dawn of civilization.

"If we succeed, generations to come will say of us now living that we mastered our moment, that we helped make the world safe for mankind.

"This is our summons to greatness."

And this, may I add, is the spirit that guides the Department of Defense.

Secretary Laird told the Jaycees:

One thing which we have learned after many years of trial and error in dealing with the fundamental problems of our society is that government action—though it can make a powerful contribution—cannot alone solve these problems. To solve them, we must tap the vast resources of the non-governmental sectors of society, of associations and individuals motivated to help their fellowmen.

To talk in more specific terms, let me mention one or two activities in which I have direct involvement as Secretary of Defense.

Under the name *Project Transition*, the Department of Defense offers to servicemen during their last few months of service an opportunity to prepare for return to school or for entry into a civilian occupation after discharge. More than 600,000 servicemen have participated in the benefits of this program. The task is one which the Defense Department could not accomplish without substantial outside help—help that has been forthcoming not only from other Government agencies but also from civilian educational institutions and more than 1,000 business organizations, large and small, as well as from organizations like the Jaycees. For occupational training and for job referrals, we rely heavily on private organizations which provide both instruction and job opportunities.

Another instance—during summer months many military bases throughout the nation make some part of their facilities available to children from disadvantaged families for learning and recreation. This activitiy, too, is a cooperative undertaking in which service personnel work together with public and private groups to select the children, and to organize and carry out the program. Again the voluntary participation of the private sector is vital to success.

Because government can't do the job alone, organizations like the Jaycees which bring together an extraordinary range of talent and an abundance of energy must commit themselves to meeting the great challenge that confronts us here in the United States. I know you are doing much already. I ask you to do more.

As long as our nation has slums or hunger or poverty or discrimination, there is a job to be done and a responsibility to be shouldered. It cannot be done without you. On your shoulders must rest the responsibility for doing all that you can to erase the blemishes that mar our society. "America the Beautiful" is an ideal which is still unfulfilled. In your lifetime it can become a reality—if you work to make it so.

The Secretary paid special tribute to one of the outstanding

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news, making them the best informed military organization of any military organization in the world."

He said it should be remembered that the AFRTS network is not a news gathering agency. "It is a news disseminating agency and there are only two major rules that limit dissemination of news in any way."

First, "... is the safety and security of the armed forces. The second is that the stations themselves must give consideration to the fact that they are operating in a foreign nation."

He said consideration must be given to that fact because the stations are operating on the basis of the permission given to them by the host country.

"I would like to point out," he said, "that we do not write our own stories. As far as armed forces radio is concerned, or TV, we use Associated Press, or United Press International. We use various network stories. This is given a great deal of coverage in the various nations."

Asked about "morale" stories, Secretary Laird said that if a speech was reported by a major network or by one of the major news services, and it did not affect the safety and security of the troops within the nation involved, or it was not something attacking the host nation's leaders, or the nation itself, the armed forces outlet would give consideration to the story.

He explained that it was not an overwhelming consideration, but a judgment factor that had to be exercised at that time.

"Now this judgment factor is being exercised on many occasions by sergeants, by first lieutenants, by captains.

"And I do not want to say that every time that particular judgment might be exercised by a given sergeant, a given lieutenant, or a given captain, at the time he reads the news ticker or as he listens to the NBC, CBS or ABC story that is being fed to him—that that necessarily always is the proper judgment.

"It's a judgment at that time, but it is a matter that is the responsibility of the commander in the area in which the outlet is operating. The commander must assume the overall responsibility for those broadcasts.

"We do not control those broadcasts from Washington, and I don't think we ever want to start doing that. I just want to make it clear that the news gathering must be done by you gentlemen (the commercial press). You have that responsibility and I hope you continue to assume it.

"The American Forces Radio and TV network does not have that responsibility and I am not going to assign that

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responsibility to them. But they do have access to CBS, NBC, ABC, AP, UPI and Reuters as far as the news gathering agencies are concerned in Vietnam."

The Defense Department's Instruction 5400.6, subject: Freedom of Information, dated May 1967 contains the basic policies for assuring a free flow of news and information to military personnel. All American Forces Radio and Television (AFRT) stations are directed to comply with this instruction. In addition, DOD Instruction 5120.20, which covers the operations of AFRT stations, follows the guidelines prescribed in the National Association Broadcasting code for newscasting.

All military broadcasters who attend the Defense Information School are trained to follow the concept of a free flow of information and the National Association Broadcasting code pertaining to news broadcast with the exceptions stated above.

The policy of AFRTS stations pertaining to the free flow of information was further explained by John C. Broger, Director of Information for the Armed Forces.

He said there is one policy governing AFRTS stations although that policy may be applied somewhat differently in certain areas of the world. The policy is that there will be no censorship or news management and that military personnel are entitled to the same rights as all other Americans where news is concerned. That is the credo followed by AFRTS stations with the following exceptions:

- The radio or television station is "a visitor" in a host country and there are courtesies that must be recognized. For instance, AFRTS stations are careful not to air material that may be offensive to the host country.
- No news will be aired that would be of potential assistance to the enemy. The local commander has the responsibility for seeing that security is not violated.
- The concern for the safety of American forces is paramount. Here again it is the commander's responsibility, for he alone has the knowledge available as it pertains to his particular area.

He explained that normal news gathering from the networks and wire services is sent to AFRTS outlets throughout the world, but that once it is received at the local station it is the responsibility of the local command to determine whether it is appropriate or not appropriate for that particular area.

It was further explained that AFRTS is not staffed by investigative reporters. The news—network or wire service—is the source for AFRTS news and the commercial press is the gathering agency.

Mr. Broger pointed out that news has become a big thing in the world today and that people are listening as they have never listened before.

He recognized that AFRTS has an increased responsibility today and stated that news coverage over more than 450 radio and TV stations world-wide—for American forces in 27 countries—must be constantly improved.

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young men—Dr. Augustus A. White, III—who served in Vietnam as an officer in the Army's Medical Corps during 1966-67. While stationed at DaNang, Captain White assisted Catholic nuns in ministering aid to patients in a nearby leper colony.

Secretary Laird said, "What Captain—or Dr. White—did for the lepers of Vietnam is, of course, exceptional, requiring training and skill that few possess. . . . Yet the spirit that Dr. White showed—the spirit of compassion, the willingness to go beyond the call of duty to help the afflicted—is not uncommon among our young men in Vietnam.

"The medics of American armed forces have brought the life-saving blessings of modern medicine to the most remote hamlets of Vietnam. American servicemen have been building schools and hospitals and orphanages. They have taught and they have healed."

Gen. Ferguson Sees Soviets Gaining on U.S. in R&D, Capabilities

The Soviet Union has increased its budget for research and development by 10 percent a year, according to Gen. James Ferguson, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, "while our own is at present on a slight decline."

General Ferguson told a graduating class at the Aerospace Research Pilot School, Edwards AFB, Calif., "For the first time, the Soviets are on a par with the United States in strategic nuclear capability—and demonstrating the ability to pull ahead."

The general added, "After centuries of being postured as a continental power, operating with interior lines of communication, the USSR is now displaying every evidence of a spreading global mobility:

- *A fast-building, modern, and ubiquitous navy*
- *A growing merchant marine.*
- *A spreading network of worldwide airline routes, with modern aircraft, including a supersonic transport in test.*
- *A brilliant exploitation of military airlift in Czechoslovakian affair.*

Following are additional excerpts from General Ferguson's speech:

Interestingly enough, at the same time as they are making this historic (turnabout) in their world outlook, the Soviets also appear to be sincere in their approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Of course, it could be argued that the very futility of general nuclear war has occasioned their turning to other means of gaining global influence as well as their amenability to arms limitation discussions.

But—why change at this time? I can only speculate, of course. But I would like to suggest to you that, very possibly, the so-called 'military/industrial complex' in the United States has succeeded rather well in its task. In solving (so many technological problems), we have done so well that the Soviet (R and D experts) realize that we cannot be outflanked.

Our main problem is perhaps that we have succeeded a little too well. To the man in the street, we may have made it look too easy to prevent nuclear wars for more than 20 years, to deter or contain limited wars, and even to put men on the moon.

The average American may well be bored by the third moon landing, but the Soviet planners—who know exactly what magnitude of effort is involved—do not get bored. They see us researching and developing new strategic and tactical weapons; they see us producing the largest airplane in the world and developing a new superiority fighter and advanced bomber; they see us committed to a larger and faster supersonic transport. And, knowing full well that they had a significant head start, they see us on the moon—in living color.

They see us doing all these things even as we fight an expensive and unpopular war 8,000 miles from our heartland.

And they know in the Kremlin—far better than most of our own laymen know—the time, the effort, the skill and dedication, and the vast commitment of resources all this requires. To them, what we do does not look easy—and in any contest of endurance, it must by now have become obvious that our far greater productivity must inevitably prevail.

GENERAL FERGUSON

That theory does not depend upon either mystery or miracle; it seems to me to be a matter of simple hard common sense, and I have never felt that the Soviet leaders were lacking in that commodity.

Of course, this situation could easily be reversed if, after having succeeded so well to this point, we should delude ourselves into a false sense of security. National security is never static; it is as intensely dynamic as the patient, plodding—but nonetheless dramatic—spadework now being carried out in some laboratory that will one day erupt into the next big breakthrough.

It has always been the mission of the military man to protect the society of which he is a part. We have, as I say, so far succeeded extremely well—so well, perhaps, as to appear to have made ourselves obsolete. But this is only temporary. It may, as I have suggested, be our great success in space—which, after all, was in large part a military contribution—that finally convinced the Soviets of the futility of constantly trying to outgun the United States.

In his concluding remarks, General Ferguson said, "So, despite the highly specialized field you are in, remember that you have a *military* mission. Military discipline is as much a part of your background as the scientific and engineering disciplines. Always wear the uniform proudly; it is the symbol of your dedication and your achievement."

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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